a world. Other translations include -affectedness‖ (Dreyfus, 1991) , -attunement‖ (Stambaugh, 1996) , -disposedness‖ (e.g. Blattner, 2006) and -sofindingness‖ (Haugeland, 2000) . In what follows, I will replace the term -state of mind‖ with -attunement‖ when quoting from Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of Sein und Zeit. 3 Elsewhere, I will refer more often to the having of a mood and to how we find ourselves in the world or belong to a world through a mood.
In maintaining that moods constitute a sense of belonging to the world, Heidegger does not mean that one has a subjective state called a mood and that this somehow contributes to perception of one's spatiotemporal location in relation to other entities.
To find oneself in a world is not, first and foremost, to occupy the perspective of an impartial spectator, neutrally gazing upon things from a particular space-time location. Rather, the world that we belong to is a significant realm, where things can have a host of different practical meanings. An appreciation of these meanings is inextricable from our actual and potential activities. Finding oneself in the world is thus a matter of being practically immersed in it rather than looking out upon it.
Consider how I currently experience my office. As I type these words, the computer keyboard does not appear to me as a conspicuous object of experience. Rather, it is seamlessly integrated into my activity, and my appreciation of its utility is inseparable from what I am doing. However, I do not take all my surroundings to be significant in quite the same way. Numerous other things that appear to me as practically significant do not solicit activities in the way that the keyboard does. For instance, the shoes sitting on the floor by my chair appear to me as functional but do not currently summon me to do anything. So we need to distinguish between having practical significance and being both significant and enticing. The pile of student essays on the table matters to me in a different way from the keyboard and shoes; they present themselves as an impediment to my current project. They still have a kind of practical significance though, which takes the form of ‗something I ought to or need to do, which is unappealing and requires effort'. Other aspects of my situation might appear to me as urgent or pressing, safe or threatening, interesting or boring, easy, difficult or impossible, predictable or unpredictable, achievable without effort, beyond my control, and so on. Practical significance thus divides up into a range of subcategories.
If another person enters the room, she or he may matter to me in yet further ways.
None of the impersonal things in my room appear to me as offering up possibilities such as conversation, companionship, consolation, love, humiliation, pride and shame. Hence there are many different kinds of significance.
Particular features of my situation do not have the kinds of significance that they do in isolation from each other. I find myself situated in a holistic web of significance relations, where the significance of one thing always relates to the significance of something else, and where all of these relations reflect projects I am currently pursuing or might pursue. According to Heidegger, this web of significance depends, in part, upon mood. A mood does not determine how a particular thing is taken to be significant, such as ‗this pen is for writing', or even how lots of things appear significant, such as ‗all the people in this room are threatening'. In order to encounter things in such ways, one must already be receptive to certain kinds of mattering, which in these cases are ‗practical utility' and ‗threat'. Without an appreciation that things can matter in these ways, one could not encounter anything as threatening or useful. This is where mood comes in. Moods constitute the range of ways in which things are able to matter to us, and are thus essential to a sense of the kinds of significant possibility that the world can offer up for us.
It is commonplace to regard moods as generalised emotions, meaning emotional states that are directed at a wide range of objects. In conjunction with this, it is often maintained that they ‗colour' perception (e.g. Roberts, 2003, p.115 There is no neat and tidy way of expressing this aspect of experience, but it is something that people do attempt to communicate, especially when they undergo substantial shifts in mood. Consider predicaments such as feeling jetlagged, hungover, exhausted or grief-stricken. 4 In these and many other circumstances, people might report an all-enveloping sense of insignificance, estrangement, unfamiliarity and so on. Sometimes, such talk refers to the way in which a particular situation is experienced, but it can also be used to convey a more encompassing way of finding oneself in the world.
Alterations in Heideggerian mood are especially pronounced in a range of psychiatric conditions, including schizophrenia, depression and depersonalisation, as exemplified by many descriptions that are offered by sufferers (Ratcliffe, 2008 is constrained by a space of mood-determined possibilities. However, Heidegger also maintains that modes of interpretation enabled by discourse can serve to determine the range of possible moods. For instance, ‗inauthentic' immersion in public ways of doing things -unthinkingly doing ‗what one does', aspiring to achieve what one ought to achieve and interpreting all of one's activities in terms of pre-prescribed public norms -restricts the kinds of moods that one can have, the ways in which things can matter:
The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood -that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ‗matter' to it. (BT, Hence the dependence between mood and discourse seems to be symmetrical. How things matter constrains the possibilities for discourse which, in turn, constrains how things matter. However, it is not clear how strong a claim Heidegger wishes to make regarding the influence of interpretation upon mood. The strong version would be that some modes of interpretation render some kinds of mood unintelligible and thus impossible. A weaker version would be that certain pervasive ways of interpreting oneself and the world actually dispose one against or prevent one from entering into certain kinds of mood, but that those moods remain amongst one's possibilities. This latter version is, in my view, more plausible. Hence it is arguable that the kind of dependence that mood has upon discourse is not as strong as the dependence that discourse has upon mood.
Depth of Mood
Some of Heidegger's discussion seems to contradict my claim that our moods determine the ways in which things are able to matter to us. He dedicates a great deal of attention to the mood of -fear‖, which is surely a way of encountering something within the world, rather than a space of possibilities in the context of which such encounters are intelligible. In fact, fear does not seem to be a mood at all but an occurrent emotion (at least if we adopt the commonplace view that emotions are brief episodes with specific objects, whereas moods are longer-term states that either do not have objects or encompass a wide range of objects). The possibility of fearing something depends upon already finding oneself in the world in a way that incorporates the possibility of being threatened. ‗Fearfulness' is not an occurrent emotion but a mood in which it is possible to encounter something as threatening and thus to be afraid: The distinction between focused emotions and the moods that make them possible is unclear in some cases. Consider the love one has for one's child. This might be described as a focused emotion but, at the same time, it is something that can ‗change one's world'. Similarly, intense grief is specifically focused and, at the same time, a radical shift in how one finds oneself in a world. (Heidegger, 1995) , he offers a detailed analysis of three different kinds of boredom [Langeweile] , which seems to indicate that moods can be understood in such a way. 9 The first form of boredom, being bored -by‖ something, is directed at a particular spatiotemporal situation. Heidegger offers the example of sitting in a -tasteless station of some lonely minor railway‖, where we explicitly feel -unease‖ and make an effort to -pass the time‖ with various idle distractions (FCM, .
Here, the boredom is directed at something -one's current situation. However, it also serves as a background that shapes how one experiences entities in the context of that situation. Events in the station take on the significance they do against the backdrop of boredom. Nevertheless, the boredom alone does not add up to how one finds oneself in the world, given that one retains a sense of the boredom as contingent and of there being other possibilities. Indeed, one is all too aware of the boredom, as things continue to matter in ways that are not encompassed by it but obstructed by it.
The second from of boredom, being bored -with‖ something, is deeper. Heidegger offers the example of being invited out to a social occasion that you do not really want to attend. You have a pleasant evening but are later struck by the fact that you were bored all night, despite not having been conspicuously, uncomfortably bored at the time. This lack of awareness, Heidegger says, arises because the whole evening is structured by the mood of boredom and so no possibilities offer themselves that might be contrasted with those encompassed by boredom. It is -our entire comportment and behaviour that is our passing the time -the whole evening of the invitation itself‖ (FCM, p.112). Here, the boredom is less conspicuous or ‗intense' than in the first case but it is deeper, in so far as the entire situation is shaped by the boredom and other possibilities do not even present themselves. In this second mood of boredom, it
would not be possible to be bored -by‖ something that occurred in the context of the evening, as the shallower form of boredom requires the presentation of alternatives, kinds of significance that can be contrasted with the possibilities that the boredom offers. The -seeking‖ that might confront the boredom is gone (FCM, p.119) and -the evening itself is our passing the time‖ (FCM, p.121).
Finding the evening boring is compatible with retaining a sense that what it offers does not exhaust the space of possibilities. But the third form of boredom is deeper still. Heidegger refers to this as boring -for one‖. Here, the boredom is not just a mood that determines the possibilities offered by a contingent situation. Everything is encompassed by it, and no sense remains of there being any possibilities for anyone that fall outside of the boredom. We find ourselves -in the whole of this indifference‖ (FCM, p.138) . Boredom this deep is not something that one can be made easily aware of, given that there is nothing to contrast it with. This is why Heidegger (FCM, p.68) maintains that the most -powerful‖ moods are those we are oblivious to.
Drawing on the example of boredom, we can offer an account of depth of mood, according to which deeper moods either facilitate or exclude kinds of mattering and therefore possibility that shallower moods presuppose. Other kinds of mood are also amenable to this kind of analysis. For example, Garrett (1994, pp.73-4) Anxiety removes the kinds of worldly concern that make fear possible, and so also removes (temporarily, at least) the possibility of misinterpreting one's death in a certain way. One cannot be afraid and anxious at the same time, as the possibility of fear requires that the possibilities made salient by anxiety remain hidden. However,
Heidegger sometimes indicates that we do not become anxious at all but are somehow anxious all the time. In addition to claiming that fear rests upon a -turning away‖ from anxiety and that it thus depends upon anxiety, he later indicates that anxiety is never absent but is instead -covered up‖ (BT, p.322, p.277), as though it were something lying dormant, with the threat of its awakening quietly permeating all our
experiences. But what I think he is saying is that the possibilities which are made conspicuous to us through the mood of anxiety are tacitly there in the absence of anxiety. Also present all along is the possibility of their becoming conspicuous through anxiety. Hence we might distinguish an inescapable disposition towards anxiety from an occurrent anxiety that may be rare. It is the former upon which the possibility of fear depends. an emphasis on revelatory capacity as a criterion for being a ground mood, in addition to depth. Hence my proposal that we understand ‗ground moods' in terms of conditions of intelligibility alone is, to some extent, a revisionary one. This, I suggest, is preferable to switching between two or more different criteria that often come apart.
It is not actually clear whether we can do philosophy during a mood such as anxiety.
For example, in the essay ‗What is Metaphysics?' Heidegger states that anxiety -robs us of speech‖ and that the -lucid vision sustained by fresh remembrance‖ is something that can inform us philosophically (WM, p.101). However, I propose that it is neither being in the mood nor having a memory of the mood that serves to inform.
What does the work is the contrast between moods. It is shifts in the sense of belonging to a world that serve to illuminate; what one previously took for granted becomes salient and thus amenable to phenomenological reflection when it is lost or distorted. Heidegger does at least hint that mood changes more generally can play a role in revealing how we find ourselves in a world: -It is precisely when we see the ‗world' unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day‖ (BT, p.177 / p.138). 11 Of course, not all mood changes will be equally illuminating. For instance, the descent into a deep depression is unlikely to be philosophically enabling, although the process of recovering from it might well be.
Given that mood changes play an important phenomenological role, the question arises as to how they might be evoked. The dynamics of mood are no doubt very complicated indeed, with moods disclosing the world in ways that then allow those moods to be transformed by experiences, activities and happenings. The understanding required to influence a mood need not add up to an understanding of that mood. One could misunderstand a mood completely and yet reliably influence it in any number of ways. Heidegger recognises that we are not completely passive before our moods, that we are responsible to some extent for regulating them. At the same time, he emphasises that some mood is always presupposed. Our thoughts might influence our moods but we would not be able to think at all unless we were already in a mood:
Factically, Dasein can, should and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. (BT, p.175 / p.136) Heidegger also refers more specifically to the effects that written and spoken language can have upon mood. The orator, he says, -must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright‖ (BT, p.178/ p.139). He also claims that, in poetic language, -the communication of existential possibilities of one's attunement can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence‖ (BT, p.205 / p.162 ). An implication of his discussion is that the role of philosophical prose is not just to convey information. The prose can serve to attune a reader or listener, to instil a mood through which the philosophy is best understood. Hence we cannot cleanly divorce the style from the content of a philosophical work, as the style can serve to evoke a mood through which the content is intelligible and without which it can only be misunderstood.
The Varieties of Mood
Heidegger only discusses a few kinds of mood in any detail. Consequently, he neglects to convey the wide range of ways in which we can find ourselves in the world. One might wonder why he focuses only on anxiety and, two years later, on boredom as ground moods through which to philosophise. What about wonder or awe, the simple amazement that -that there is something rather than nothing‖ (Staehler, 2007, pp.423-4) Because this aspect of experience is most often referred to as a kind of feeling, I have referred to it as -existential feeling‖, rather than mood (Ratcliffe, 2005 (Ratcliffe, , 2008 .
Another reason for using the term ‗feeling' is that, in addition to constituting how one finds oneself in a world, many or all of these predicaments seem to incorporate changed bodily awareness. This is not to say that they are experiences of the body. As
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception and Sartre's Being and Nothingness both make clear, bodily awareness can be a way in which the body perceives rather than a way in which it is perceived. It is through the feeling body that we experience the world, and so a bodily feeling need not be contrasted with experiencing something in the world or, for that matter, with a background sense of belonging to a world. However, in avoiding this task, he also fails to sufficiently acknowledge the diversity of and subtle differences between these -modes of attunement‖. Consequently, the referent of the term ‗anxiety' starts to look a little unclear. (Brampton, 2008, p.26) . In severe depression, the possibility of anything appearing as practically significant is gone from experience, as is the possibility of certain significant kinds of interpersonal connectedness. The world therefore offers nothing and one's sense of the future is correspondingly altered. Without meaningful transitions from future to past, awareness of the difference between them is eroded.
Mood and Time
Hence the overall structure of temporal experience is changed. Distortions in the perception of time's passing, and also in the sense of ‗past', ‗present', ‗future' and how they interrelate, occur in various other psychiatric conditions too, as well as in more mundane circumstances. 12 Consider, for example, the difference in how time is experienced when listening to a boring talk and when giving the talk.
That moods have such effects is something Heidegger readily acknowledges, and he suggests that the mood of boredom is characterised by alterations in the sense of time.
Moods, he says, are modifications of time and can thus be understood in terms of time. Although one might feel tempted to maintain, in the case of profound boredom, that -one feels timeless, one feels removed from the flow of time‖, a temporal structure still remains (FCM, p.133). However, many first-person accounts of depression not only report that things no longer appeared significant. They also describe an inability to conceive of things ever having been significant: -There was and could be no other life than the bleak shadowland I now inhabited‖ (Shaw, 1997, p.25) . The loss of practical significance from experience is something that applies equally to a sense of past, present and future. Consider the following: -What time is it? A little after ten in the morning. I try to remember what ten in the morning means, how it feels. But I cannot. Time means nothing to me anymore‖ (Brampton, 2008, p.29) . Of course, clock time, which is what the author refers to, is not original temporality. But the reason she finds clock time meaningless is that she has lost the presupposed sense of practical significance that makes timing and scheduling one's activities intelligible. Granted, practical significance itself has a temporal structure:
one finds something significant in so far as one encounters its possibilities in the context of a situation that is already the case. But it is not clear that a mood which renders practical significance no longer intelligible depends upon time in such a way as to warrant the view that time is somehow more fundamental than mood. The loss of significance is not a way of experiencing time but something that determines the ways in which time can be experienced. Numerous authors describe depression as somehow atemporal:
When you are depressed, the past and future are absorbed entirely by the present moment, as in the world of a three-year old. You cannot remember a time when you felt better, at least not clearly; and you certainly cannot imagine a future time when you will feel better. Being upset, even profoundly upset, is a temporal experience, while depression is atemporal. (Solomon, 2001, p.55) This is partly because practical meaning is altogether gone from experience. The sense that anything is significant, ever was significant or ever could be significant is absent. The overall structure of temporal experience presupposes this absence of significance; the loss thus seems irrevocable, prior to time, outside of time. One possibility is that mood and time are inextricable but that neither is wholly analysable in terms of the other. A stronger claim that might be made on behalf of mood is that it is more phenomenologically fundamental than time, that mood is presupposed not just by the ways in which temporal experience is organised but by the possibility of any kind of temporal experience.
